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Options for reducing the future cost 
of NZS areexamined in more detail, 
and compared to present settings, in a 
Treasury background paper, Future Costs 
of Retirement Income Policy, and Ways of 
Addressing Them, which was published at 
the same time as the statement. This article 
takes the analysis in that background 
paper as its base.
Assessment criteria
The assessment is based around the 
Treasury’s Living Standards Framework 
(Treasury, 2012). The present approach 
and four broad possible alternative 
approaches to retirement income policy 
are considered here in terms of their 
likely impact on the components of that 
framework. Retirement income policy can, 
to a greater or lesser extent, affect outcomes 
under each of those components: 
• sustainability for the future: via 
impacts on direct fiscal costs;
New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) is a universal pension 
paid at a flat rate. It is effective at poverty prevention among 
the elderly, relatively inexpensive and simple to administer. 
However, with the proportion of the population aged over 
65 years set to increase rapidly over the next 50 years, there 
is expected to be a steep rise in the costs of the scheme. The 
future cost of NZS is therefore a major driver of New Zealand’s 
Longer-term Fiscal Challenge. The Treasury’s statement on 
New Zealand’s long-term fiscal position (Treasury, 2013a) 
examines ways of addressing this cost, as well as other possible 
responses to the broader fiscal challenge such as higher 
taxation or reductions in other areas of public spending. 
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• economic growth: via impacts on 
labour force participation and 
national (private and public) saving;
• increasing equity: via impacts on 
old-age poverty rates and inter- and 
intragenerational distribution;
• social infrastructure: via confidence 
engendered by the dependability 
of political reform, and via public 
and private administrative and 
compliance costs; 
• reducing risks: via the potential 
impact of private savings levels 
on New Zealand’s high levels of 
international indebtedness, and 
the impact of different approaches 
to pension funding on individual 
longevity and investment risk.
Reform options
New Zealand’s present approach is a 
government-arranged PAYGO (pay-as-
you-go) system, using current tax revenue 
to finance the pensions of current NZS 
recipients. Any option that shifts away from 
that approach must move it towards either 
a privately-arranged PAYGO approach, 
under which an individual would need to 
earn more of his or her own keep at later 
ages, or towards a SAYGO (save-as-you-
go) approach, which involves building up 
funds in advance which are later used to 
fund pension costs.
Broadly, then, four options are 
identified for reducing the demand 
on future taxpayers to fund future 
pensioners. 
• Raising the age of eligibility for 
New Zealand Superannuation would 
reduce the overall future cost of NZS, 
compared to what it is currently 
expected to be, by reducing the 
number of individuals that NZS 
would be payable to. On its own this 
policy change would not affect the 
level of payment or the universal, 
flat-rate nature of NZS. 
• Changing the way in which NZS 
levels are indexed to slow down 
the rate of increase would reduce 
the relative value of individual 
NZS entitlements over time, while 
retaining the flat-rate, universal 
nature of the payment. Effectively 
NZS is currently linked to wage 
inflation; we model shifts to price 
inflation and to a composite index.
• Making private saving compulsory 
and later using some of that saving 
to part-fund an individual’s own 
NZS would effectively involve 
applying a means-test to NZS, within 
a specific and narrow definition of 
‘means’. Voluntary savings, including 
those already accumulated under 
KiwiSaver, would not be included in 
this approach to means-testing, nor 
would income earned from other 
sources, in view of the administrative 
complexity and unproductive 
avoidance behaviours that broader 
means-testing is likely to entail. 
• Communal saving could be 
undertaken through further 
extension of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund over and above 
the contributions already intended. 
This, and the investment returns 
that the fund would earn, would 
subsequently be used to cover all, 
or part, of the costs of NZS, which 
would continue to be paid at the 
same level and on the same universal, 
flat-rate basis. 
Comparing the options
Fiscal sustainability
The extent of the reduction in future 
PAYGO costs by any given future date 
would in each case depend on how far the 
proposed reform goes. However, there is a 
clear difference in the paths by which the 
different approaches reach future reduced 
costs. 
Where there is a single new age of 
eligibility, the fiscal cost eventually settles 
on a path parallel to and below the 
current projection. This pattern would be 
repeated whatever eventual age and rate 
of change were adopted. An approach 
based on longevity indexation would be 
more likely to continue to diverge from 
the current projected path.
Where the indexation methodology is 
changed, the total cost reduces indefinitely 
as a proportion of GDP despite the 
expected increase in the number of 
pensioners. In practice it is likely that 
political pressure arising from increasing 
levels of old-age poverty as the real value 
of NZS reduced would at some point 
prompt a reversion to wage indexation or 
upward ad hoc adjustments in the level 
of NZS. In both cases, reductions in the 
total cost of NZS would be likely to be 
offset to some extent by an increase in 
the cost of other welfare benefits claimed 
by over-65s unable to fund their living 
costs through continued work, savings or 
reliance on family resources.1 
A key feature of any transition 
towards SAYGO is that economy-wide 
costs will initially increase before they 
decrease. In the early years, existing 
pensioners continue to be paid their 
NZS entitlements on a PAYGO basis, 
while working cohorts must at the same 
time make contributions to the SAYGO 
fund. Effectively, transitional generations 
pay both for some proportion of their 
own pensions and for the full cost of 
the pension entitlements of earlier 
generations. The higher the required 
saving rate, the faster and the higher are 
the eventual cost savings achieved. 
A private SAYGO scheme leads to 
savings for the government but increases 
the costs faced by individuals, who must 
reduce either their consumption or their 
voluntary saving rate, during a transition 
period. The subsequent offset to NZS 
means that this is in part a real cost, 
not simply a redistribution from earlier 
to later in an individual’s life. Fiscal 
savings from this approach may be offset 
to the extent that the government finds 
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... transitional generations pay both for some 
proportion of their own pensions and for the 
full cost of the pension entitlements of earlier 
generations.
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it necessary to offer tax breaks or other 
forms of incentives to encourage saving. 
A communal approach intended to 
fund only the flat-rate universal NZS 
might be cheaper. This is because if 
everybody is required to contribute at the 
same rate, some individuals will contribute 
more than is needed to fund their own 
NZS. Under a communal approach, this 
‘surplus’ is then redistributed towards 
meeting the shortfall for individuals who 
do not contribute enough to cover their 
own NZS. Under a private approach, the 
‘surplus’ would remain with the high-
income individual and shortfalls would 
have to be met otherwise. 
Economic growth
Retirement income policy can have an 
indirect effect both on national income 
levels and on external borrowing 
requirements via its impact on national 
savings, which is in turn the result of the 
interaction of private and fiscal savings. 
However, the mechanisms are complex, 
depending on internal feedback loops 
and factors external to retirement income 
policy, such as risk premiums, interest 
rates and the exchange rate. We look here 
at the likely first-order impact on national 
saving.
Previous increases in the age of 
eligibility for NZS do not appear to have 
had much of an impact on private saving 
behaviour. From the individual’s point of 
view, they now have a longer working life 
to save for a shorter period of retirement 
and so the amount they need to save per 
year reduces. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that raising the age of eligibility 
for NZS does seem to encourage higher 
levels of labour force participation among 
older workers. 
Reducing the real level of entitlement 
is also likely to encourage greater labour 
force participation by older people, as 
they decide to make up at least some of 
the shortfall by increasing their time in 
work. However, people are more likely to 
need to increase their saving as well. While 
they can work for a few more years to fill 
the shortfall caused by a delay in their 
access to full NZS, they are less likely to 
be able to work, or rely on their families, 
for the whole of their retirement. 
A transition towards a SAYGO system, 
whether on an individual or a communal 
basis, would be expected to cause income 
to be diverted from current consumption 
to saving to meet future retirement costs, 
and therefore to produce a transitional 
reduction in the consumption/GDP ratio. 
A move to greater pre-funding may also 
have a negative impact on labour force 
participation as the immediate rewards 
for work reduce.
International evidence provides 
little conclusive evidence on the scale 
of the increase in private saving under 
compulsion, but suggests that it is usually 
directionally positive.2 The bulk of the 
savings increase typically comes from 
lower- and middle-income households. 
Higher-income households are typically 
already saving at or above the compulsory 
rate, and so are more likely to respond 
to savings compulsion by redirecting 
their voluntary saving than by forgoing 
consumption to increase their overall 
saving rate (Davis and Hu, 2006). 
It is even more difficult to know to 
what extent higher savings will translate 
into increased productive capital stock in 
New Zealand. But again our judgement is 
that it is likely to be directionally positive 
for capital stock as it is likely that some 
part of the higher savings will be retained 
within New Zealand. The effects on 
productivity and output are uncertain. 
It is possible that a public SAYGO 
approach, involving investment into 
a single large fund, would deliver 
higher returns in the long run than 
a private SAYGO approach involving 
a large number of individual funds. 
This is because a large fund will benefit 
from economies of scale and a longer 
investment horizon, enabling investment 
in higher-risk growth-oriented assets, 
whereas individual accounts face 
proportionately higher fees and may be 
more conservatively invested in view of 
individual investors’ shorter time horizons 
(Dyck and Pomorski, 2011). On the other 
hand, the labour disincentive effect could 
perhaps be less in the case of a private 
SAYGO approach. Contributions are less 
likely to be perceived as a tax, but rather 
as an increase in individuals’ overall 
lifetime wealth (Karam et al., 2010). 
Reducing risks: macro
A higher rate of national saving will be 
required if the economy is to increase 
overall investment without increasing 
overseas debt. The impacts of retirement 
income policy reforms in this area 
therefore depend on how individuals 
adjust their savings behaviour in response, 
and on broader fiscal policy settings. 
We have shown that behavioural effects 
may vary between different approaches, 
but broadly we would expect that the 
greater the reduction in lifetime income 
expectations, the more people are likely to 
respond by cutting back on consumption 
and increasing saving. This suggests 
that the impact on household saving of 
retirement income policy reform may not 
depend on what the government does so 
much as how hard it does it. 
Sustained increases in private savings 
behaviour will contribute positively to 
reducing New Zealand’s macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities. However, the overall 
impact on national savings would be 
significantly greater if the government 
were to use the fiscal savings to reduce 
deficits (increase surpluses), rather 
than using the savings to finance 
spending elsewhere or to reduce taxes. 
... the overall impact on national savings would 
be significantly greater if the government were to 
use the fiscal savings to reduce deficits (increase 
surpluses), rather than using the savings to finance 
spending elsewhere or to reduce taxes. 
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New Zealand’s strong fiscal frameworks, 
which require the government to take 
a long-term approach to fiscal strategy, 
help manage this risk. 
Reducing risks: micro
The risk that individual will live longer 
than they had expected, and so run out of 
savings, is particularly difficult to bear as, 
by the time they are aware that they will 
live longer than expected, it may be too 
late to do anything about it. Therefore, 
it seems inappropriate for individuals 
to bear the bulk of longevity risk. The 
government, however, is well placed to 
hedge individual longevity by pooling risk 
across entire cohorts. 
Raising the age of eligibility and 
SAYGO approaches ensure that individuals 
continue to receive at least as much as 
they do under the present approach 
throughout their pensionable lives, and 
therefore do not change the allocation 
of longevity risk. Under a compulsory 
individual saving approach, the Crown 
may – depending on the finer details of 
the scheme – be able to transfer some of 
the longevity risk through annuitisation 
arrangements. 
A slower-growing NZS entitlement 
is still paid throughout an individual’s 
lifetime after the age of eligibility; but 
people are more likely to need additional 
savings to supplement the reduced 
entitlement, and the consequences are 
worse if they are not able to manage 
those savings in a way which delivers 
them an adequate income throughout 
their pensionable life. Part of this risk is 
still retained by government also, since 
individuals who run into hardship as a 
result of outliving their savings, or not 
having enough to sustain themselves, 
are likely to turn to additional welfare 
assistance. 
None of the options directly addresses 
the opposite risk – that individuals 
who live fewer years after retirement 
receive less NZS in total. While this risk 
would ideally be addressed through 
policy interventions aimed directly at 
the fundamental issue – health-related 
disparities in life expectancy – this is 
neither straightforward nor likely to de-
liver significant improvement in the short 
term. However, it can also be mitigated to 
the extent that an individual’s retirement 
wealth is his or her own to consume (or 
bequeath) at the rate he or she chooses. 
Options which encourage individuals to 
build up larger independent retirement 
savings as well as, or even instead of, a 
life-long entitlement may therefore be 
preferable from this perspective.
Options which increase the share 
of the costs of pensions met from 
capital accumulation, rather than 
from contemporary taxation, help to 
diversify risk away from dependence on 
contemporary economic growth levels. 
Under compulsory private savings, 
both the amount of retirement income 
available to the individual and the NZS 
payable by the government depend on total 
accumulations of private savings. This 
means that the Crown and the individual 
share investment risk. Individuals have 
a range of options to manage their 
investment risks, and allowing them to 
manage this risk themselves will allow 
them to select a risk level which is optimal 
for their individual circumstances. On 
the other hand, transferring risk to the 
government allows it to be managed over 
a greater time horizon, reducing the risks 
posed by short-term financial market 
fluctuations. A balance would need to 
be struck between protecting individuals 
from risks that they are not well placed 
or competent to manage, on the one 
hand, and avoiding the encouragement 
of inappropriately high-risk investment 
approaches by individuals relying on 
government to rescue them if things go 
wrong on the other.
A publicly managed retirement 
fund may be at less risk of fraud or 
theft than individual accounts. Under 
this option, the Crown takes on a 
greater level of investment risk: the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
may, or may not, deliver the returns on 
investment necessary to enable it to pay 
future pensions to the extent intended. 
International experience shows that large 
funds managed on behalf of the public 
do not always deliver good returns, and 
some have suffered substantial losses. The 
individual is also indirectly exposed to 
this risk, with less scope to manage it, as 
the Crown is likely to pass on the cost of 
investment underperformance through 
increased taxes or reduced benefits 
(Whitehouse et al., 2009). 
Equity: distributional impacts
Different people will experience different 
impacts on their total pension wealth 
under different reform options, depending 
on their age and their lifetime income. 
Treasury has undertaken modelling to try 
to quantify these impacts, but these must 
come with a heavy caveat as they are so 
dependent on assumptions, and outcomes 
are so dependent on many individual 
variables.
Under the present approach, people 
who live longer receive more NZS overall. 
This difference remains about the same 
under an across-the-board reduction 
in NZS entitlements under changed 
indexation. However, the difference in 
lifetime expectation of pension receipts 
is exacerbated if the age of eligibility is 
increased. 
Under the present arrangements, 
younger people can expect to receive more 
formal pension in total than will older 
people, due to the former’s higher life 
expectancy. This would remain the case 
under a ‘communal SAYGO’ arrangement, 
which would retain the universal flat-rate 
nature of NZS entitlements. However, the 
effect is temporarily reduced if the age of 
eligibility is increased. 
Under the present arrangements, younger people 
can expect to receive more formal pension in total 
than will older people, due to the former’s higher 
life expectancy.
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Under a changed method of 
indexation, younger individuals can 
expect to receive substantially less than 
older people will, and less than they 
would under present arrangements; by 
the time they reach pensionable age, 
the value of the pension will be less. 
This approach would be likely to mean 
that although the purchasing power of 
NZS would be maintained, recipients’ 
NZS income would fall relative to wages 
earned by contemporary workers. 
Under a private SAYGO arrangement, 
younger individuals have more time 
to build up their own savings and 
therefore have greater retirement wealth. 
Older people would be less affected as 
they would not have time to build up 
significant mandatory savings.
In terms of the impact on people at 
different income levels, a private savings 
approach will establish more of a formal 
relationship between contributions made 
and pension received, and hence be more 
‘actuarially fair’ in terms of being a closer 
match between contributions and total 
benefits. Notably, in view of the tendency 
for women to experience lower lifetime 
earnings due to their greater probability 
of spending time out of the workforce, 
such an approach is likely to increase 
gender inequality in retirement. 
The upfront cost of a private SAYGO 
approach is likely to have quite significant 
welfare impacts on working-age house-
holds, depending on their present 
approach to saving. Positive welfare effects 
will (eventually) result from compulsion 
for those households who could save 
but are currently ‘under-saving’ due, for 
example, to myopia or other cognitive 
biases. Negative welfare effects will result 
for those households for which it is 
optimal to not save in financial assets. For 
example, there will be some individuals 
whose lifetime income would be higher 
if they were to invest in a business or 
in upskilling, but who will be prevented 
from doing so by being compelled to save 
in a prescribed vehicle over their working 
lives. Similarly, some households may be 
better off repaying their mortgage more 
quickly, rather than or before building up 
financial assets. Low-income households 
who are financially constrained may 
also not experience an overall welfare 
improvement if they are forced to transfer 
resources from the short term to the long 
term. 
A communal approach to SAYGO has 
a different intragenerational distributional 
effect. Broadly, the effect of a shift in 
this direction would be to redistribute 
resources from richer people earlier in 
their lives, to poorer people (within the 
same age cohort) later in their lives. Once 
established, therefore, this approach is 
largely progressive in the same way as 
the present approach under which higher 
income individuals pay more through 
their taxes, but everybody receives the 
same annual NZS payments. 
The transitional generation, in 
funding part of its own pension as well as 
that of contemporary pensioners, would 
get a worse deal than earlier generations, 
who funded only older people’s pensions. 
However, if we act quickly and impose 
some of the transitional costs on the 
generation that is currently at middle age, 
this generation will still get quite a ‘good 
deal’ in absolute terms, because the older 
cohort that the current generation must 
fund is relatively small. 
This point emphasises the importance 
of an early start, if this transition is to be 
made. A taxpayer who is supporting a 
quarter of a pensioner, as current cohorts 
are doing, is better placed to contribute 
towards his or her own pension as well, 
compared with one who is supporting 
half a pensioner, as future cohorts are 
likely to be doing (Coleman, 2012).
Social institutions
Any reform is likely to be effective only 
to the extent that the policy change is 
sustained through to the long term. 
Policy change is unlikely to engender 
confidence and trust, and hence will 
not bring about the desired behavioural 
change, if people do not believe that the 
change is permanent, or cannot see how 
it will affect them well into the future. 
Reform therefore needs to be not only 
fiscally sustainable but also clear, easily 
understood and seen to command broad 
political support. For this reason it is 
important that an approach should be 
capable of adaptation if outcomes are 
greatly different from expectations; but 
in a way which is transparent, predictable 
and objective so as to reduce the risk of 
politically-motivated change and the 
incentive for interest groups to seek to 
influence it. 
In the case of reforms to the age of 
entitlement, an approach objectively 
linked to an external factor such as 
longevity might be more politically 
sustainable than a revised age of eligibility 
set at an arbitrary level which may or may 
not need to be changed again later. 
In the case of reforms to the way in 
which NZS is calculated, one possible 
variation would be a system under which 
the relationship between salaries and 
a new pensioner’s entitlement would 
remain the same (through continued 
wage indexation), while pension levels for 
existing pensioners were linked to a greater 
extent to prices. Each superannuitant 
would receive weekly NZS payments set 
relative to the average wage as it stood at 
the time when they personally reached 
the age of eligibility. Over time the value 
of each individual superannuitant’s NZS 
payments would be indexed to keep up 
with inflation, but would decline relative 
to the average wage. This would mean 
... any system which involves different entitlements 
for different people will be more complex, 
require more individual monitoring, and so be 
more expensive to administer and more prone 
to administrative error than a flat-rate universal 
pension.
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that each cohort transitioning from work 
to pension would continue to experience 
the same impact on their living standards 
as previous cohorts, rather than each 
cohort successively experiencing a greater 
difference between wage and pensions 
on transition. However, it would mean 
different pension levels for pensioners of 
different ages and this may prove difficult 
to sustain politically.
In the case of SAYGO options, where 
a large public fund is built up, it may be 
difficult to sustain the ring-fencing of 
increasingly large amounts of resource 
to fund pensions if more immediate, 
or politically attractive, requirements 
emerge. In a system in which Parliament 
is sovereign and parliaments cannot bind 
their successors, it would be difficult to 
design a public SAYGO system that would 
avoid this risk. 
The approach to individual SAYGO 
described here is intended to minimise 
avoidance opportunities and compliance 
and administration costs, compared to 
an approach under which more or all 
of an individual’s assets and income 
were included in a means test. But it is 
nevertheless inevitable that any system 
which involves different entitlements for 
different people will be more complex, 
require more individual monitoring, and 
so be more expensive to administer and 
more prone to administrative error than 
a flat-rate universal pension. 
Approaches which rely more 
on individuals making their own 
arrangements, either by encouraging or 
making compulsory a higher personal 
contribution to total retirement wealth, 
increase the private administrative cost as 
well as the risks for those individuals.
Getting from options to a choice
While the Living Standards Framework 
enables a systematic comparison of 
options, it cannot on its own be used 
to determine which approach, or 
combination of approaches, is ‘best’. 
Views on that will continue to depend on 
individual value judgements about what 
are the general objectives of retirement 
income policy, and how they are to be 
prioritised against other calls on public 
resources; Questions such as the following 
need to be asked.
• How socially tolerable is old-age 
poverty, weighed against welfare for 
other life stages?
• How can the need to lean against 
poor individual decision-making 
be balanced with the desirability 
of individual autonomy and 
preferences? Is there a public interest 
in increasing private saving which 
affects this balance?
• How confident can we be that rates 
of return on investment are likely to 
continue to outpace rates of growth 
in the economy?
• Does greater accumulation of assets 
on the Crown’s balance sheet via 
public pre-funding increase the 
risk of looser-than-otherwise fiscal 
policy?
• Is it acceptable to continue to 
push costs forward onto future 
generations?
Treasury hopes, through the 
publication of the Statement on the Long-
Term Fiscal Position and accompanying 
analysis, to inform and provide a 
framework for public debate on these 
and other pertinent questions of public 
values.
1 About 40% of New Zealand pensioners currently have no 
income other than NZS. See Ministry of Social Development, 
2013, section 1, ‘Income trends for older New Zealanders, 
1982–2012’. 
2 Survey evidence suggests that about a third of private 
contributions to KiwiSaver represent savings which would not 
otherwise have been made (see Law et al., 2011). 
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